ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARD – TIME BAR AND LACHES

Recently, the High Court issued a judgment concerning whether it was too late for an applicant to seek to have an arbitral award recognised and enforced as a judgment or order of court, when the said award was obtained on 17 July 2019 and the application for recognition and enforcement was taken up on 15 July 2025.

 

Background. An arbitral award was issued on 17 July 2019 (the “Award”) by a sole arbitrator pursuant to an ad hoc arbitration between South of England Protection and Indemnity Association (Bermuda) Ltd (in liquidation) (“SEPIA”) and Pacmar Shipping Pte Ltd (“Pacmar”).

As Pacmar did not satisfy the Award, SEPIA filed an application to recognise and enforce the Award under sections 19 and 29 of the International Arbitration Act 1994 on 15 July 2025 (the “Recognition Application”) and obtained an order in its favour on 16 July 2025 (the “Recognition Order”).

Pacmar then filed an application to, amongst others, set aside the Recognition Order and/or for the enforcement of the Award to be refused.

This blog focusses on two aspects: Pacmar’s argument that the enforcement of the Award was time-barred pursuant to section 6(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, and that the doctrine of laches applied and the enforcement of the Award should be refused.

The time-bar argument. Pacmar submitted that the 6-year time bar under section 6(1)(c) of the Limitation Act started to run on the date the Award was issued, i.e., 17 July 2019. As such, the limitation period expired on 17 July 2025.

While the Recognition Order was obtained on 16 July 2025 (before 17 July 2025), Pacmar submitted that as the Recognition Order provided that “enforcement of the Award could only take place 14 days after the Recognition Order was served on the Defendant or until any application to set aside the Recognition Order had been disposed of” (Judgment [19]). As such, since Pacmar was only served the Recognition Order on 18 July 2025, the Award could only be enforced on 1 August 2025, after the expiry of the limitation period on 17 July 2025.

This argument was rejected by the High Court.

The High Court held that what mattered was that the action to enforce the Award was brought within the 6-year limitation period. The High Court held at [24] that “the six-year limitation period under s 6(1)(c) of the Limitation Act is only applicable when an applicant is seeking to register and enforce an arbitral award as a judgment of the Singapore court, and not when that applicant is seeking to enforce or execute the court judgment that they have obtained as a result of the award. Indeed, it cannot be said that the statutory limitation period is circumvented or extended after an award has been registered and enforced as a judgment.” This stemmed from a distinction between “(a) the substantive right to sue for and obtain a judgment; and (b) the procedural machinery for enforcing a judgment that has already been obtained” (Judgment [23]).

Given this, the statutory limitation period no longer applied once SEPIA had commenced the Recognition Application and the Recognition Order granted.

 

Doctrine of laches. Pacmar also sought to argue that the doctrine of laches applied to the case, as SEPIA had waited almost 6 years before seeking to enforce the Award. Pacmar argued that it was prejudiced as “the interest on the claimed sum of US$82,332.40 has compounded monthly at an excessive rate to an amount exceeding US$217,000” and it had lost corporate records due to a cyber-attack it had suffered.

This argument, too, was rejected by the High Court. The High Court held that as the procedure to enforce and recognise an arbitral award is a statutory mechanism, not an equitable claim or relief, the doctrine of laches does not apply (Judgment [42]).

The High Court further held that there was, in any event, “no compelling reason” for the doctrine of laches to apply, since there was already a statutory time bar provided for under section 6(1)(c) of the Limitation Act.

 

Conclusion. It is always crucial to be able to enforce an award (or judgment). This case is a reminder that when it comes to arbitral awards, it is important to ensure that an action to enforce the award is taken up on time. A prolonged delay may lead to the complications, and may, in a worst-case scenario, lead to a situation where the enforcement application is time-barred.

 

This publication is not intended to be, nor should it be taken as, legal advice; it is not a substitute for specific legal advice for specific circumstances. You should not take, nor refrain from taking, actions based on this publication. Chancery Law Corporation is not responsible for, and does not accept any responsibility for, any loss or damage that may arise from any reliance based on this publication.

Xian Ying Tan